Recent empirical studies show that career concerns may be employed as a tool to improve the e¢ ciency of a political hierarchy. This paper investigates whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career concerns to improve the performance of provincial governors. To that end, we have constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during [1895][1896][1897][1898][1899][1900][1901][1902][1903][1904][1905][1906][1907][1908][1909][1910][1911][1912][1913][1914]. Measuring a governor's performance by the intensity of peasant revolts and worker strikes in the province under his rule, we provide evidence that the central administration rewarded better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces (gubernias). These results are robust to various sensitivity tests. In addition, we show that political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on career mobility, and the performance evaluation of central authorities did not change signi…cantly in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution. With these …ndings, we shed some more light on the period that led to the collapse of the Russian Empire.
Introduction
Career concerns are an important factor determining the e¢ ciency of any hierarchical structure. For instance, Holmström (1999) shows that managers'career concerns can create incentives for better performance.
In the context of political hierarchy, a number of empirical studies have shown that future appointment prospects can be a means to incentivize provincial leaders to work more e¢ ciently. For example, Li and Zhou (2005) show that, in the post-Maoist China, promotion of provincial leaders hinged upon the economic growth of the province under their rule. Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011) provide evidence that the Soviet central authorities also applied career incentives to provincial governors during Khrushchev's Sovnarkhos reform. They also show that this scheme, in turn, bene…tted local economic growth. Jia et al. (2013) , on the other hand, re…ne the previous conclusions about the political system in modern China, and demonstrate that performance and personal connections are complementary determinants of a governor's career.
In this paper, we study provincial governors in the last two decades of the Russian Empire, [1895] [1896] [1897] [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] . To that end, we have …rst constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during [1895] [1896] [1897] [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] . Then, we investigate whether central authorities employed career incentives based on gubernatorial performance. Our measure of performance is based on the intensity of social unrest in a province, i.e. on a governor's ability to maintain peace and security in his province. Historians argue that, during the last decades of the empire, the main parameters of interest for the Tsarist regime were political stability, peace and order in the provinces, and thus to secure regime's survival. 1 Therefore, we deem our performance measures appropriate for the speci…cities of the time period and the central administration's agenda.
Using panel data …xed e¤ects models and the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes as performance measures, we provide evidence that there was only partial application of career concerns in the empire. In the main provinces of the empire (gubernias) performance did not a¤ect career mobility, however, career incentives were in place in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts). This e¤ect was also economically signi…cant. For example, one standard deviation reduction in peasant revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion for an oblast governor. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in peasant revolts in oblasts more than tripled the likelihood of promotion.
In addition, we test the e¤ect of political connections on career mobility, and we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect. Moreover, we test whether central authorities had a more attentive policy of performance evaluation in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution, and …nd no signi…cant change in their attitude towards career incentives.
Studying the time span of 1895-1914 is essential for several reasons. It covers the period since Nicholas II assumed tsardom until his last years in power. This allows us to have consistency in the pattern of governor appointments under the reign of a single tsar. Moreover, this question has historical importance, as it sheds light on to the causes of the Russian Empire's collapse. We show that the central government failed to use career concerns to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in the gubernias). Thus, in the absence of any reward or punishment mechanism, governors might have haphazardly managed their gubernias with no vision of improving their performance. This, in turn, results in poor performance of preventing the spread of the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section brie ‡y describes the historical background building up to the reign of Nicholas II. Section 3 puts forward hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents empirical results and some sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.
Historical Background
Gubernias were major administrative units in the Russian Empire and were ruled by governors. Gubernias were …rst introduced by Peter the Great in 1708 and were maintained until the collapse of the empire. Although, initially Russian Empire was divided into 8 gubernias, by 1914, through subsequent reforms and territory expansion, the number of gubernias went up to 78.
The governor of a gubernia was considered as the "tsar's viceroy" in a province, appointed directly by the emperor, and, at the same time, an o¢ cial of the Ministry of Internal A¤airs (Mosse (1984) ; Zaionchkovskii (1978) ; Robbins (1987) ). According to the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire (Svod Zakonov), the main task of the governor was to guarantee the "inviolability of the supreme rights of the Monarchy, the bene…t of the state and the universal, exact observance of laws, codes, supreme edicts, decree of the Senate, and the authorities'orders." Secondly, the law prescribes the governor "to protect the public peace, the security of everyone and the observance of the statutory regulations, order, and security laws." It should also be noted that the governor controlled the police and appointed the key police o¢ cers in the gubernia.
With the reforms of 1864 governors lost some of their judicial power and were constrained by local governments (zemstvos) in deciding on economic and social matters. However, in 1866, in the wake of Karakozov's attempt on the life of Alexander II, the government issued laws augmenting the power of governors: the right to unannounced inspection of any provincial state body; the right not to approve any provincial o¢ cial's appointment on the grounds of political unreliability and the right to close any organization or society engaged in anti-governmental activities and in any activity threatening state security. In 1876, governors'authority was extended to issue "mandatory regulations" which allowed them to prohibit meetings or to close newspapers (Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Eroshkin (1983) ). In subsequent decades, governors'powers were further reinforced, especially with Alexander III's "political counterreforms" (Eroshkin (1983) ). All things considered, by the time Nicholas II assumed tsardom in late 1894, governors were the masters of the province with extensive powers and they were an important part of the Russian bureaucratic structure.
In the period under study, in addition to regular gubernias, there were a number of territories known as oblasts. Majority of then-existing oblasts were in the periphery, located in the outlying regions of the Empire. These were mainly in the south, Caucasus, Urals, Siberia and Central Asia with their non-Russian minority populations (e.g. Kars Oblast or Transcaspian Oblast). Figure 1 highlights the spatial distribution of gubernias and oblasts. We observe that while gubernias were mostly in the main European part of the empire, oblasts were predominantly peripheral.
There were 21 oblasts in 1914.
Oblasts were governed by special statutes.
2 While regular gubernias were ruled by civil governors, oblasts were mainly headed by governors with a military background possessing both civil and military powers. At the same time, oblasts were liable to the Ministry of War, while gubernias were liable to the Ministry of Interior. The aim of the central administration was to integrate oblasts into the regular system of imperial governance, which was hampered in the oblasts by local institutions of the minorities and strategic threats in the region (Abashin et al. (2008) ). For example, (2008)). The essence of this system was the inseparability of military and civil powers, and keeping the traditional institutions of self-governance under the control of the Russian administration (Abashin et al. (2008) ). Oblasts were meant to be temporary administrative units, and in fact, some territories were successfully turned into gubernias. However, despite the measures towards administrative uni…cation with the rest of the Empire, the military-popular governments of oblasts lasted till 1917 (Bobrovnikov et al. (2007 ).
On the whole, we can summarize the typical characteristics of the oblasts as follows:
1. Oblasts were usually peripheral regions marked by social and economic backwardness concomitant with a high share of non-Russian minorities.
2. They were ruled by military governors who possessed both military and civil 2 Svod Zakonov, Vol. II.
powers and were usually in the military service. They were appointed by the
Emperor, yet the candidates were chosen by the Ministry of Interior in coordination with the Ministry of War.
3. The administrative apparatus of oblasts was on the whole more primitive and centralized than in gubernias. The military governor, through the system of oblastniye pravleniya (oblast board), exercised wide powers in the spheres of law, police, public …nance and interaction with indigenous population. Importantly, zemstvos (elected local government bodies) were also absent in the oblasts.
4. Based on points 2) and 3), we can infer that the governors of the oblasts were more powerful masters of the entrusted territories than the rulers of the regular gubernias.
Lastly, the institution of governorate-general was another important element of the imperial system of administration. A governorate-general spanned over several gubernias or oblasts and was ruled by a general-governor, who, like military governors, also had both military and civil powers. Their powers were very wide, and they could intervene into all spheres of administration in the provinces and overrule governors. For instance, Poland, Caucasus or Siberia were all subject to governoratesgeneral, which might have been a result of military and political considerations such as proximity to potentially hostile states or military resistance by the local population (Eroshkin (1983) ; Damesheck et al. (2007)). Robbins (1987) argues that while favouritism and patronage continued to play a role in political hierarchy, expertise and e¢ ciency became ever more important in appointment decisions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The ministry of interior achieved a more consistent procedure in the selection of o¢ cials and there was a growing "professionalisation" (Robbins (1987) ). Despite absence of any order in governors'appointments in the legislation, the ministry was working to improve appointees'professional qualities and was elaborating formal criteria of selection (Blinov (1905) ).
Previous studies on the institutions of imperial governorship in Russia mostly addressed the issue of selection criteria for the candidates of governorship. This paper, instead, focuses on whether governors'performance and personal characteristics in ‡uenced their subsequent career paths.
The …rst hypothesis we test is whether gubernatorial performance a¤ected further careers of governors. We argue that, during the time period we consider, the ability of governors to maintain peace and security in provinces was the main measure of performance evaluation by the central government. Robbins (1987) argues that "peace was the governor's profession. Among many duties assigned to His Excellency, none was more central than the maintenance of law and public order. The Svod Zakonov listed numerous obligations: protecting the state against its enemies, preserving the security of the tsar's subjects from attacks by thieves, swindlers, and bandit gangs, suppressing civil disturbances, and upholding public morality." Therefore, we measure a governor's performance by the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes in the province under his rule.
In fact, there are a number of cases when governors' ability to manage the po- (1902 -1905) led to their demotion ; Brigadin and Lukashevich (2009); ; Koshko (1916) ; Witte (1923) ).
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A second hypothesis is that favoritism and patronage remained important in shaping governors' careers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that connections played a prominent role in o¢ cial appointments in the Russian Empire. For instance, Alexei
Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, Tver governor in 1903 -1904, was dismissed due to his rather eccentric treatment of political opposition. Yet, as he was in Nicolas II's and his wife's good graces, he immediately received an appointment to the Senate (Dmitriyeva and Sereda (1996) ). We test this hypothesis using proxies for political connections: having 3 Among other examples, Vladimir Launitz was appointed as the mayor of Saint-Petersburg after his paci…cation of Tambov gubernia in 1905. Kharkov governor (1902 Kharkov governor ( -1903 , Ivan Obolensky, vigorously suppressed peasant unrest ‡ogging peasants across the gubernia, and these actions, endorsed by Pleve, the Minister of Interior, brought him the position of Finland's governor-general (Witte (1923) ). 4 In addition, Tomsk governor Azanchevskiy-Azancheev, after the pogroms in Tomsk accompanied by the …re in the theater and numerous deaths, was dismissed and later was not able to resume his service (Urusov (1908) ). Alexei Lopukhin, the head of Estliand gubernia, was reposed in 1905 because he was suspected of his "too liberal" approach towards the revolutionaries (Witte (1923) ). He was attached to the Ministry of Interior and later dismissed from the Ministry due to his critique of the police. Vikentii Raaben lost his o¢ ce of the Bessarabia governor in 1903 because of his indecisiveness during the Jewish pogrom in Kishinev (Urusov (1908) ). Ivan Kholshchevnikov, the military governor of Zabaikalskaya oblast in 1906, was dismissed and sentenced to prison because of his arguable lenience to the revolutionary movement (Rediger (1999) Third, administrative status of a province could shape the way performance evaluations factored into governors'promotions and demotions. As detailed in the previous section, in oblasts, unlike in gubernias, governors had both civil and military powers with wide authority. In addition, economic, social and political circumstances in oblasts di¤ered from those in gubernias, given that oblasts had large shares of non-Russian minority and were in the peripheral regions. On the one hand, enhanced gubernatorial powers in oblasts rendered those governors more responsible (in the eyes of central administration) for the state of a¤airs in the entrusted oblast.
On the other hand, given the local particularities of the oblasts, central government had higher expectations from oblast governors in terms of peace keeping and security. Therefore, accountability of oblast governors for social unrest in the respective oblasts could be more deterministic for future careers than for gubernia governors.
We capture this with a dummy variable for oblasts and test whether performance was rewarded di¤erently in oblasts and gubernias.
The last hypothesis to test is the role of the revolutionary period of 1905-1907, which could render a governor's ability to cope with disturbances more indispensable to the central government in the subsequent period. After 1905, the tsarist administration may have become more attentive to the ability of governors to promote peace and security, and may have rewarded them accordingly. Indeed, Lieven (1984a) notes that "to some extent the events of 1905 -1906 shocked the monarch and his advisers into appointing much younger and more vigorous men to key posts". 5 We test this 5 Robbins also argues that by 1906 the Ministry started to systematically evaluate "the moral hypothesis by interacting governors'performance with a post-1905 dummy.
Data
Combining several sources, we have constructed a database on more than 300 governors with their personal characteristics and pre-and post-gubernatorial appointments between 1895-1914. Data on the periods of governors'rule come from Morukov and Samokhvalov (2003) . Biographical data on governors come from a wide range of published and online sources. The entire list of resources we have consulted is in the Appendix A.
Taking into account all available information and relying on Lieven (1984b), 6 we have coded career mobility either as a promotion, equal to 1, or same level, equal to 0, or a demotion, equal to -1, with respect to governorship. Appendix B provides a discussion of the coding procedure of career mobility and Shapkarin (1959 Shapkarin ( , 1966 Data on our second measure of performance, number of worker strikes, are taken from Varzar (1905 Varzar ( , 1908 Varzar ( , 1910 Lastly, we have a set of macro-variables at the province level. These capture whether a province was an oblast, whether a province was under a governorategeneral, urban population, rural population and grain yield 9 .
The de…nition and summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2 .
On average, a governor was 52 years old, had been in o¢ ce for 4.7 years and had an average rank slightly lower than 4. 63% of the governors had higher education, about one third had a court title, more than half of them had a current or former military a¢ liation and 16% carried a noble title (e.g. duke, count). It is important to note that these …gures almost coincide with those given in Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Robbins (1987) .
7 Revoliutsiya 1905 -1907 v Rossii. Dokumenti i materiali. 50 let 1905 -1955 , Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955 Sciences, -1965 Labour legislation was …rst introduced in 1882 with the creation of the Inspectorate of Factories (in charge of health and life saving regulations).
9 Data on grain yield are from Obukhov (1927) .
Following the methodology of Li and Zhou (2004) and Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011) , we estimate a …xed e¤ects model of the following generalized form:
Our main dependent variable is C it which captures career mobility of a governor, coded "-1" for demotion, "0" for staying at the same level or a lateral move and "1" for promotion. U it is a vector of social unrest, peasant revolts and worker strikes.
P it is two dummies for personal connections, court title and previous experience in the central apparatus. D it is a vector including two dummies, one for oblasts and a post-1905 dummy. X it is a vector of controls, including personal characteristics of governors and social and economic indicators of provinces. i and t stand for province and time …xed e¤ects, respectively. " it is an error term that allows for within province correlation as we cluster errors at the province level. We have chosen to employ OLS methods rather than ordered probit or logit in order to avoid incidental parameters problem when biased estimates of …xed e¤ects may lead to further bias in other coe¢ cients of interest. We have validated that all the results carry over if we use ordered probit or logit instead of OLS. In column 2 of Table 3 , we test whether favoritism and patronage played a role in governors' promotions. We use having a court title and previous experience in the central apparatus as a proxy for political connections, and show that these two measures had no signi…cant e¤ect on governors'careers. Thus, we …nd no statistical evidence for the claim that favoritism and patronage were rampant in the Russian Empire and could shape one's career.
Main Results
In column 3, we test whether governors' performance was evaluated di¤erently in oblasts and gubernias. Our …ndings suggest that although there were no career incentives to improve performance of governors in the gubernias, career concerns were applicable for oblasts governors and their performance was rewarded accordingly. The estimate of the interaction of peasant revolts and oblasts is negative and signi…cant.
Therefore, we show evidence that the governors of oblasts were more likely to be promoted if they performed well in the o¢ ce, and be demoted if they performed poorly.
This e¤ect is also economically important. One standard deviation reduction in the variable Peasant Revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in the Peasant Revolts variable more than tripled the likelihood of promotion.
In addition, Figure 2 provides us with an illustrative understanding of the evolution of average careers and peasant revolts in gubernias and oblasts over the years.
We observe that while there was no clear pattern between career and peasant revolts in gubernias, there was a remarkable link between career and peasant revolts in oblasts. Often, a change in peasant revolts in oblasts was met with a change of career in the opposite direction. In other words, on average, in oblasts, a reduction in the number of peasant revolts was associated with more promotions, and an increase in peasant revolts was associated with more demotions.
This result con…rms our conjecture that performance of an oblast governor could be more in ‡uential for future career prospects than for a gubernia governor. Wider responsibilities of military governors under more tense political circumstances in oblasts might have made central authorities more responsive to governors'ability to maintain peace and security, and hence better incentive schemes to improve governors' e¢ ciency were in place.
Finally, in column 4 of Table 3 , we test whether authorities have become more reactive to governors'performance in the post-revolutionary period of 1906-1914. We …nd no signi…cant e¤ect of performance on promotion in the post-1905 period.
In columns 5-8, we replicate the same tests with our second measure of performance, worker strikes. The results are remarkably similar to our previous …ndings.
Governors'performance in ‡uenced their career only in oblasts, but not in gubernias.
Political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on securing a promotion, and post-1905 period did not witness an increased sensitivity of authorities to governor performance.
Sensitivity Analysis
We present in Table 4 further robustness checks. We start by assessing the e¤ect of economic growth in a province. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 , we take into account grain yield growth as a measure of economic growth. We show that grain yield growth had no signi…cant e¤ect on promotion, while the impact of governor's performance on their career is the same as before. It has an impact only in oblasts, but not in gubernias.
The governors of oblasts were mostly military men. In our entire sample 87% of governors in the oblasts were in the military, while only 17% of governors of gubernias were military men. One may think that some unobservable characteristics of governors could lead to such di¤erences in career determination between oblasts and gubernias. Alternatively, the career pattern in the army might lead to promotion independently of performance, and that might be the reason why we have a di¤erential …nding in oblasts and gubernias. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 , we test whether the governors in the oblasts get promoted just because they are army-men. We …nd no such evidence. The e¤ect of being in the military is insigni…cant both in oblasts and in gubernias.
Another possible criticism may refer to the construction of the dependent variable, which may overvalue or undervalue the status of some promotions. We have experimented with some alternatives and created a new variable called Career2 and also created a promotion dummy that treats same level changes and demotions as zeros. In order to create Career2 variable, we lowered the status of some military o¢ ces (chiefs of sta¤ and logistics, previously promotions, were considered as lateral transfers, the o¢ ce of a corps commander became demotion), and raised the status of some civil ones (membership in the Council of the Minister of Interior and Consultation of the Ministry of Justice, becoming aide of a governor-general were considered as lateral transfers). In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 , we observe that even with the new dependent variable, Career2, previous results go through. And in columns 7 and 8, we use the promotion dummy as a dependent variable, despite the fact that this reduces the variation considerably. We see that the results are similar to previous …ndings, although there is some weak e¤ect now in the gubernias in the case of peasant revolts. This is probably due to the fact that there are only 69 promotions and there is very little variation.
Lastly, we have reproduced, not reported, our baseline speci…cations with ordered probit and ordered logit models, and previous …ndings go through.
Conclusion
This paper shows that the central authorities of the Russian Empire employed career incentives to improve the e¢ ciency of provincial governors only in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces of the empire (gubernias). This …nding is important in that it sheds more light on to the causes of the Russian Empire's collapse. Failure to incentivize governors to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in gubernias covering a larger part of the territory and the population) might have been re ‡ected in poor performance of preventing the spread of the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.
We also show that political connections had no signi…cant e¤ect on career mobility, and the central authorities did not change in their attitude towards career incentives in the post-1905 period.
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Since Peter the Great there existed an order of o¢ cial ranks. According to the Table   of Ranks, o¢ cials'ranks (chin) were listed together with the classes (klass) of positions that could be occupied by them (Lieven, 1984a) . 11 For instance, this formal system of the classes ranked the o¢ ce of Minister, Deputy Minister, membership in the State Council and the Senate higher than the governor's o¢ ce. 12 In addition, Lieven (1984b) writes that for top o¢ cials working in Saint Petersburg the pay, conditions of service, and career prospects were far better than for those who worked in the provinces. 13 Governors could be transferred to Petersburg and most of such transfers were considered as a promotion. For example, ministership or deputy ministership were a promotion in comparison to governorship; and the membership in the State Council or the Senate were popularly perceived as a sinecure (Zaionchkovskii, 1978) . 14 Thus, these positions are coded as a promotion. On the other hand, the Council of the Minister of Internal A¤airs was seen as the last resting ground for the failed o¢ cial, and hence, was a demotion (Lieven, 1984a) .
However, the Table of Ranks does not provide fully satisfactory guidance that can 11 Lieven also notes that rank system was subject to criticism for being cumbersome. "In particular, automatic promotion in rank and the legal requirement of senior rank for candidates for political o¢ ce has at times been seen as breeding a spirit of routine and mediocrity in the government class" (Lieven (1984a) ). But in practice the system was rather ‡exible "because numerous exemptions and loopholes made... [the regulations] dead letter" (Ibid., p. 207).
12 Table of Ranks can be found at: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1700dok/tabel_end.php. 13 Anecdotal evidence also points out that an ambitious o¢ cial should rather stay in Petersburg than hold an o¢ ce of the same class in the province. Lieven gives the example of A. N. Mosolov who …nally became a member of the State Council: "Transfer to provincial service [after being head of Department of Foreign Faiths] was, however, rightly seen by Mosolov as a near fatal blow to his ambitions, his vanity and to his desire one day to play a key role in formulating governmental policy" (Lieven (1984a) ).
14 Lieven (1984a) argues that the State Council was formally the highest and probably the most prestigious institution in nineteenth-century Russia. The membership in the State Council was particularly aspired by top o¢ cials because of the exceptionally high pensions paid to former State Council members. be applied to every type of position. The sphere of in ‡uence of an o¢ cial was also a factor that one needs to take into account. For example, a governor ruled over up to several million people, while a brigade commander commanded about 5000 people, although both had the same class. Therefore, moving from governorship to a brigade commander or a division commander is coded as a demotion. Moreover, as mentioned before, positions in Saint Petersburg were more attractive than the provincial positions of the same class due to future career prospects they o¤er (Lieven (1984a) ).
Thus, the head of a ministerial department is coded as a promotion, although it had the same class of a governor. Finally, to measure the real relative status of di¤erent positions, it might be instructive to look at salaries, as some o¢ ces of equal class might have di¤ered with respect to material gains. According to the …gures provided in Zaionchkovskii (1998) , in the early 1900s governors were paid 9600 to 12620 rubles per year, while the division commander and the corps commanders received 6000 and 9300 rubles per year, respectively. As far as some civil o¢ ces are concerned, the Deputy Minister of Interior received 15000 rubles per year and a member of the State Council earned between 12000 -18000 rubles per year.
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15 Saltykov-Schedrin, in Pompadours and Pompadouresses, describes the unenviable fate of a retired governor who was forced to retire without ever becoming a senator: "He left everything that was dear to his heart, and left not in order to decorate by himself one of the halls of the magni…cent building with the windows overlooking the Senate Square, but in order to join the ranks of those murmuring and vainly hoping, who in these days somewhat peculiarly overcrowd the squares and streets of Petersburg".
Moreover, since there was no compulsory age of retirement, retirement is considered as demotion, except when there is a clear indication that the governor in question was seriously ill (Koshko (1916) ).
Cases of arson, damage to cattle, illegal tree cutting and plowing were counted by the number of involved estates. When the peasants of several villages participated in a single act, it was considered a single case. Repeated incidents in an estate over a short period were considered a single episode. Full destruction of an estate (or a rich peasant's farm) was also counted as a single episode. Peasants'armed clashes with the troops or the policemen were taken as separate episodes.
Agrarian workers' strikes (which were frequent in the Western gubernias) were counted by the numbers of folwarks that went on a strike. Cases of violent expulsion of workers by peasants were also counted.
Cases of illegal propaganda (if the agitator gathered a peasants meeting); resolutions (prigovori) of peasants'meetings (skhodi) containing political and economic requirements addressed to the authorities; processions and demonstrations with banners; laying economic claims to landlords by peasants were counted separately.
Illegal deposition and reelection of the local administration, refusal to pay taxes, clashes with security forces restoring order, attacking police in order to release prisoners were also counted.
In late 1905 -early 1906, there were armed rebellions in Kurliandskaya, Li ‡iand-skaya, Estliandskaya and Kutaisskaya gubernias. Such episodes of resistance to the authorities were counted.
Revolts sweeping over the entire gubernia were counted as a single case. If particular revolts were explicitly mentioned, they were counted separately. 
